Transport resilience to weather and climate: A perspective from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil by Sakamoto Ferranti, Emma et al.
 
 
University of Birmingham
Transport resilience to weather and climate: A
perspective from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Sakamoto Ferranti, Emma; Fontana Oberling, Daniel; Quinn, Andrew
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Sakamoto Ferranti, E, Fontana Oberling, D & Quinn, A 2018, 'Transport resilience to weather and climate: A
perspective from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil', Travel Behaviour and Society.
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
 1 
 
Transport resilience to weather and climate:  1 
A perspective from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 2 
 3 
Emma Ferranti, Daniel Fontana Oberling, Andrew Quinn.  4 
 5 
Transport is fundamental in modern society to access work, education, healthcare and other amenities. In megacities, 6 
the high demand for transport ensures that even minor or short-lived disruption to transport systems caused by 7 
extreme weather can impact a large number of people. However, there are few transport resilience studies from the 8 
global south where the majority of current and future megacities are located. This study provides a unique 9 
perspective on transport resilience to weather and climate from Rio de Janeiro. The three mass-transit systems; rail, 10 
metro and bus rapid transit (BRT) are often affected by urban flooding which can inundate the tracks and stations, 11 
and/or prevent customers from reaching the stations. On the BRT system, hot temperatures cause air-conditioning 12 
failures, over-heating engines, and heat-related deformation of the road surface. The Centre of Operations (COR), 13 
which integrates datasets and personnel including municipal and state civil servants and private transport operators, 14 
has previously co-ordinated the municipal response to extreme weather. There is a municipal Climate Change 15 
Adaptation Strategy, but climate change planning or adaptation is not undertaken by transport operators.  The study 16 
provides five recommendations to improve transport resilience; (i) quantify the impact of weather on the transport 17 
system; (ii) undertake a climate change risk assessment for transport; (iii) continue operational integration of 18 
transport systems; (iv) improve integration of transport systems at strategic planning level; and (v) uphold strong 19 
leadership from the COR. More perspectives are needed from the global south to enrich existing transport resilience 20 
research.  21 
Keywords: transport resilience, climate change, global south, extreme weather, global south 22 
 23 
1. Introduction 24 
In the future, increasing numbers of people will live in urban areas (UN, 2016a), and urban areas are expected 25 
to experience more extreme weather events associated with climate change (Rahmstorf & Coumou, 2011; 26 
Coumou & Rahmstorf, 2012; Fischer & Knutti, 2015). The resilience of urban transport systems to weather 27 
and climate is therefore paramount; transport allows people to access jobs, markets, education, healthcare 28 
and other amenities, which are fundamental to modern society (UN, 2016b). Nowhere is this more important 29 
than in megacities where transport demand is high (Morichi, 2005), and in which urban sprawl has led to high 30 
and generally increasing travel times (Gakenheimer, 1999; Motte et al., 2016). The high demand for transport 31 
services in megacities ensures that even relatively minor and/or short-lived disruption to the transport 32 
systems caused by extreme weather has the potential to impact a large number of people.  Moreover, the 33 
majority of current (24 of 31) and future (34 of 41) megacities are in the developing global south (UN, 2016a) 34 
where economic and social issues such as poverty and poor infrastructure services makes them particularly 35 
susceptible to extreme weather events (Mirza, 2003; De Sherbinin et al., 2007; Cervero, 2013). 36 
There are numerous studies examining the impact of extreme weather on transport systems (e.g. Koetse & 37 
Rietveld, 2009; DfT, 2014; Molarius et al., 2014; Jaroszweski et al., 2015; Ferranti et al. 2017), or the potential 38 
longer-term impact of climatic change (e.g. National Research Council, 2008; Koetse & Rietveld, 2009; 39 
Jaroszweski et al., 2010; Palin et al, 2013; Leviäkangas, & Michaelides, 2014; Jaroszweski et al., 2014). This 40 
includes several large European projects: MOWE-IT (Management of Weather Events in the Transport 41 
System)1; WEATHER (Weather Extremes: Impacts on Transport Systems and Hazards for European Regions)2; 42 
EWENT (Extreme Weather impacts on European Networks of Transport)3; UK-based Tomorrow’s Railway and 43 
                                                          
1 http://www.mowe-it.eu/ 
2 http://www.weather-project.eu/weather/index.php 
3 http://ewent.vtt.fi/ 
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Climate Change Adaptation (RSSB, 2015); and, the International Union of Railway’s (UIC) Rail Adapt project4. 44 
There are also several studies that consider the concept of transport resilience (e.g. Mattson & Jenelius, 2015; 45 
Reggiani et al., 2015; Wang, 2015), or that measure the resilience of a particular system(s) (e.g. DfT, 2014; 46 
D’Lima & Medda, 2015). However, excepting Schweikert et al. (2014) and Hearn (2015) there is little research 47 
describing the impact of weather and climate on transport, or discussing transport resilience in the global 48 
south. Indeed, Koetse & Rietveld’s (2009) overview of the impact of climate change and weather on transport 49 
includes over 28 case studies from North America, over 13 case studies from Europe, and others from 50 
Australia, Israel and Japan; but no case studies explicitly from the global south. Similarly, the International 51 
Transport Forum (ITF) report, Adapting Transport to Climate Change and Extreme Weather features few case 52 
studies from the global south, and all the working group members are based in the global north (ITF, 2016). 53 
There is also little consideration of the socio-cultural context of transport resilience. For example, urban 54 
flooding is only considered problematic for road transport in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, when the level of 55 
water is deeper that a motorcycle exhaust pipe (interview, HCMC, January, 2017). Similar or lesser depths of 56 
flooding would be unacceptable in London. The expectation of transport resilience therefore varies globally, 57 
and transport resilience studies must consider the local context. 58 
This study presents a perspective on transport resilience from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, derived from interviews 59 
undertaken with transport operators and academics based in the megacity. In recent years, Rio de Janeiro 60 
has hosted a series of mega-events (World Youth Day and papal visit, 2013; FIFA World Cup, 2014; Summer 61 
Olympic Games, 2016) and the public transport infrastructure has received more than $4.5 billion in 62 
investment (Castro et al., 2015) from public and private sectors, including international organisations such as 63 
the World Bank. This case study from Rio de Janeiro is therefore important both as a perspective from the 64 
global south, and in terms of a mega-event legacy. The discussion considers the resilience of the urban 65 
transport systems and provides some recommendations from research and operational best practice in the 66 
global north (e.g. Koetse & Ritvald, 2012; DfT, 2014; Dawson et al., 2016). 67 
 68 
2. Introduction to Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area 69 
2.1 Overview of urban area and governance  70 
The Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area (RJMA; Figure 1) is the second most populous region in Brazil with 13 71 
million inhabitants (UN, 2016a). The RJMA has 21 municipalities, including the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, 72 
the state capital, where approximately 50% of the population (6.5 million) live. Rio de Janeiro contrasts 73 
between low-lying coastal plains, hilly regions, and mountainous peaks where urbanisation is not possible 74 
(e.g. Sugar Loaf Mountain). This severely constrains transport routes, which must pass either through or 75 
around the massifs. The municipality has more than 1,000 favelas, i.e. areas of informal land development, 76 
typically on hillsides, which are home to an estimated 1.5 million people.  Sanitation infrastructure in favelas 77 
is often poor; indeed 40% of the population (not only the favelas) is not connected to a formal sewage system 78 
(Brasil, 2013).  The unplanned and unregulated nature of favelas has implications for urban transport 79 
resilience. For example, favelas may be close to transport infrastructure such as railway lines, and inadequate 80 
drainage and sanitation infrastructure may lead to waste on the lines, blocked drains, and increased risk of 81 
flooding during heavy rainfall. Favelas also have a high population density, and residents are less likely to 82 
have a car and more likely to depend on public transport.  83 
Figure 2 illustrates several key points important for understanding transportation in RJMA. Firstly, population 84 
density (Fig 2a) is highest in the North Zone along a corridor that includes rail, road and metro links to the 85 
Central Business District (CBD) in the Central Zone (Fig 3a). Secondly, formal employment opportunities (Fig 86 
2b) are concentrated in three main areas: service sector jobs in the CBD; industrial/freight transport jobs in 87 
                                                          
4 https://uic.org/railadapt-report  
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the northwest and port area near São Cristóvão and Ramos; and domestic and service sector jobs in the South 88 
Zone (e.g. Copacabana, Ipanema, and Leblon) (Motte et al., 2016).  Finally, excepting favela residents, low 89 
income earners tend to live further away from the employment areas, whereas high-income earners live 90 
closer to employment areas (PDTU, 2015). The concentration of employment opportunities in the central 91 
and southern zones has created a strongly pendula travel pattern in the RJMA with high demand for transport 92 
services towards the central and southern zones each morning, and the reverse each afternoon and early 93 
evening. Those with the lowest levels of income, and therefore less likely to own private transport often 94 
travel a greater distances, and are most reliant on public transport to commute.  95 
Three spheres of public power govern the RJMA; federal (national), state, and municipal. Transport 96 
infrastructure is owned by the state, but operated by private companies, which may be state (e.g. SuperVia) 97 
or municipal (e.g. BRT) concessions. A new incumbent began a four-year term as Mayor of Rio de Janeiro 98 
municipality in January 2017. The tenure of his predecessor, Eduardo Paes (2008-2016) included many public-99 
private infrastructure projects (including transport) in preparation for the mega-events of the FIFA World 100 
Cup and the Summer Olympic Games, and was characterised by a modern governance style that promoted 101 
digital information and communication technologies (Section 4.4) to improve city-level management 102 
(Paschoal & Wegrich, 2017). Brazil is currently experiencing political upheaval with several politicians under 103 
investigation as part of the Operation Car Wash (Lava jato) corruption scandal. The state of Rio de Janeiro 104 
state was declared bankrupt in 2016 and the former State Governor of Rio de Janeiro was found guilty of 105 
passive corruption and money laundering in June 2017. There are also ongoing fraud investigations 106 
surrounding the new metro Line 4; (Rio Times, 2017a) and some transport operators (Rio Times, 2017b).  107 
 108 
2.2 Weather and Climate Change 109 
Summer in RJMA is generally warm and comparatively wet, whereas winter is mild and drier. The average 110 
daily maximum temperature ranges between 25°C (Jun-Sep) and 30°C (Feb) and monthly mean rainfall ranges 111 
from 50 mm (Aug) to 169 mm (Dec) (Met Office, 2017). The coastal regions benefit from a sea breeze, but 112 
the densely populated northern and western inland areas behind the Tijuca and Pedra Branca massifs (Fig. 113 
1) experience a strong urban heat island effect and can be 4-6°C (or more) warmer than parts of the South 114 
Zone (De Lucena et al., 2015).  115 
Since the 1960s, the city has become warmer; both the mean maximum temperature and the number of 116 
warm days has increased, whilst the number of cold days has decreased (Dereczynski et al., 2013). Climate 117 
modelling projects an increase in mean temperature of 1.4°C by 2070; the maximum temperature could be 118 
4.5 °C warmer (Silva et al., 2014; note these temperature projections do not include the urban heat island 119 
effect). 120 
Heavy rainfall events are commonplace from December to April, and notable 24hr rainfall events include 121 
January 1998 (272.8 mm), April 2006 (252.8 mm), and April 2010 (323.0 mm) (CCAS, 2016). Heavy rainfall 122 
events frequently cause localised urban flooding disrupting transport, and have previously caused 123 
catastrophic landslides closing transport routes. Detecting and projecting future changes in rainfall is limited 124 
by the availability of observational data (two stations); total annual rainfall has slightly increased, and the 125 
amount of rainfall falling during heavy rainfall events has increased at one station (Dereczynski et al., 2013), 126 
and is projected to increase in the future (Silva et al., 2014).  127 
As a coastal city, Rio de Janeiro is extremely vulnerable to future changes in sea level, and the frequency of 128 
storm surges has increased since records began in 1850 (De Sherbinin et al., 2007; CCAS, 2016). Storm surges 129 
can cause urban flooding in lagoon areas (e.g. Lagoa) and cause drainage canals to overflow as seawater 130 
flows upstream through the channel. Understanding the impact of global sea level rise and future changes 131 
to storm surge frequency in RJMA is difficult for oceanic observations are insufficient in terms of quality and 132 
quantity (CCAS, 2016).    133 
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2.3 Overview of public transport in Rio De Janeiro 134 
This study focuses on the largest transport systems in terms of infrastructure assets; the overland train 135 
system, the metro system, and the new Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system (Fig 3a). Other public transport 136 
systems include the VLT (Veículo Leve sobre Trilho) light rail system that was developed for the 2016 Olympic 137 
Games (Fig 3b). It is a municipal-level concession with two lines that operates only within the Central Zone. 138 
The Teleférico do Alemão, (2011-2016) and Teleférico da Providência (2014-2016) are two new gondola 139 
systems that served large favela complexes in the North and Central Zones (respectively; Fig 3b). These were 140 
operated by state-level concessionaries but operations ceased in 2016 after the Olympic Games. There is also 141 
a ferry service between Niterói and Rio de Janeiro.   142 
Additionally, there are also municipal buses (i.e. that travel within one municipality such as Rio de Janeiro, or 143 
Niterói), and intermunicipal buses that operate on the existing road networks. In 2016, the municipality of 144 
Rio de Janeiro had 705 bus lines, operated by four consortia (48 companies), undertaking 53 thousand vehicle 145 
trips per day, with a fleet of around 9,000 vehicles; there were also 650 lines intermunicipal lines in the RJMA, 146 
operated by 58 companies, undertaking 65 thousand vehicle trips per day with a fleet of around 6,500 147 
vehicles (GRJ, 2016). The construction of the BRT network and recent austerity measures have led to the 148 
reorganisation and removal of some of these lines, reducing accessibility to high schools and employment, 149 
especially for those in poorer areas (Pereira et al., 2017).   150 
 151 
3 Research Approach 152 
This perspective on transport resilience in RJMA is derived from twelve interviews with transport operators 153 
(6), civil servants (4), and academics (2) undertaken in Rio de Janeiro in January 2017. All participants were 154 
interviewed under agreement of anonymity.  155 
In Section 4, the analysis considers the following three questions for the train, metro and BRT systems, and 156 
for the municipal Centre of Operations (COR): 157 
1. What is the current provision of the transport system? 158 
2. What is the impact of current weather on transport system? 159 
3. What are the climate change adaptation strategies? 160 
Section 5 considers the transport infrastructure as a whole and discusses: 161 
4. Are the main transport systems resilient to current weather and future climatic change?  162 
5. How could transport resilience be improved in Rio de Janeiro? 163 
The analysis provides a series of recommendations, which were shared with the interview participants.  164 
It is important to note that quantitative data was not available for this study and the impact of weather and 165 
climate is based on the opinions of those interviewed, who were interviewed whilst operating in their 166 
professional capacity. There is no peer-reviewed analysis on the impact of weather or climate on the 167 
transport infrastructure of RJMA as there is for countries such as the UK (e.g. Palin et al., 2013; Jaroszweski 168 
et al., 2016; or Ferranti et al., 2017). Therefore, where possible, case studies are backed up with reports from 169 
the press or other sources. Indeed, gathering independent quantitative evidence on the impact of weather 170 
is a key recommendation of this and previous (e.g. CCAS, 2016) studies (Section 6).   171 
 172 
  173 
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4. Results: Current provision of transport & impact of weather and climate, future climate change 174 
adaptation 175 
4.1 Railway network: current provision, weather impacts and climate change adaptation 176 
The railway is the oldest (since 1854) mass transit infrastructure in the RJMA and the network extends 70 km 177 
from the CBD, and into peripheral towns (Figure 3a). The infrastructure is state owned, but SuperVia have 178 
run operations since 1997, and recently renewed their contract until 2048. Infrastructure investment is a 179 
condition of renewal and SuperVia have undertaken asset modernisation and procured a new fleet. Ridership 180 
has increased from approximately 200k people/day in the 1990s, to 600k people/day (January 2017) and the 181 
railway mainly transports commuters from northern and western areas to their employment in the Central 182 
and Southern Zones. Consequently, there is a strong pendula movement with crowded trains operating in 183 
one direction, and empty carriages returning in the reverse. Commuting 50 km each direction every day is 184 
commonplace and SuperVia believe that 90% of the passengers using the railway network earn a salary lower 185 
than twice the minimum wage (R$937/month in 2017).  186 
Extreme weather impacts the railway infrastructure and disrupts the service provision (Table 1a). Heat is a 187 
regular problem during summer (Dec – Feb). It can cause the track to expand and buckle (e.g. UOL, 2018), 188 
the signalling systems to short circuit, or cause the overhead lines to expand and sag, causing problems with 189 
the pantograph connection. Auto-tensioned lines reduce the problem however these are not commonplace 190 
throughout the network. To minimise the impact of heat-related problems Supervia undertake a visual 191 
inspection at 11:00, 13:00, or 15:00 hours in vulnerable locations on days where ambient temperature 192 
exceeds 35 C. If maintenance is required, this is undertaken where possible outside peak commuting times; 193 
the trains can be diverted and a reduced service is provided. Where heat causes track circuit failure, manual 194 
signalling and reduced services operate until the fault is repaired. Generally, heat does not lead to the 195 
complete closure of any rail lines. More than 95% of train journeys are air-conditioned and passenger surveys 196 
undertaken by SuperVia indicate passengers are happy with the temperature inside the carriages.  197 
Pluvial flooding following rainfall is a citywide problem (CCAS, 2016) and the railway infrastructure is overland 198 
and open with gaps in enclosure walls and level crossings.  Floodwater can flow onto the railway line, forcing 199 
the line or local station to close until the water dissipates. Neighbourhood flooding (e.g. Olaria, Penha; Fig 200 
3b) can prevent passengers from accessing the station or platforms (e.g. Fig 4). Rainfall also changes 201 
passenger demand. When there is rainfall in the morning, the railway network experiences a 3-5% decrease 202 
in ridership as passengers prefer to use local buses to commute the whole distance rather than get wet 203 
travelling to the train station, or avoid making the journey entirely.  Conversely, on rainy afternoons the 204 
railway network experiences increased demand as the train service is considered more reliable than local 205 
buses whose service may be disrupted by urban flooding. Passengers may also decide to delay their journey 206 
home until after the rain has stopped.  207 
Damage to the overhead lines (OHL) from debris (e.g. trees /branches) on the tracks is the main reason for 208 
line closures during windy conditions. Often the debris may originate from the neighbourhoods outside the 209 
lineside area managed by Supervia. For example, on 1st January 2017 a billboard and trees fell onto the 210 
railway lines damaging power cables near Nova Iguaçu (Figure 3a) and closing the line (Globo, 2017a).  211 
Lightning can also damage signalling and telecommunication systems.  212 
Some aspects of the SuperVia modernisation program such as replacing existing OHL with autotensioned OHL 213 
has acted to increase the resilience of the infrastructure to extreme weather (in this case heat). However, 214 
there is no strategic approach to evaluate, mitigate, or adapt to, any of the climate change impacts outlined 215 
in Section 2.2.   216 
  217 
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4.2 Metro network: current provision, weather impacts and climate change adaptation 218 
The metro network has expanded in stages since 1979. The infrastructure is state owned and has been 219 
operated by MetrôRio since 1998, who recently renewed the contract until 2038. Infrastructure 220 
modernisation is a condition of renewal and MetrôRio recently invested in two new stations (Uruguai and 221 
Cidade Nova; Figure 3b), a new control centre, contributed towards a new vehicle fleet (with state 222 
government funding the remaining 85%), a new line (Line 1a), and modernised the older infrastructure and 223 
fleet. Following the completion of Line 1a, the Lines 1 and 2 share the same tunnel network between Central 224 
and Botofogo, reducing the efficiency of the system and giving a common point of failure. Line 4 opened in 225 
2016 and is a legacy of the Olympic Games. It connects Barra de Tijuca, a wealthy coastal neighbourhood in 226 
the West Zone with the southern end of Line 1. Line 4 is operated by MetrôRio on behalf of another 227 
concession, Rio Barra. Approximately 900k people/day use the entire metro network: 600k people/day on 228 
Line 1 (note all passengers who enter at Botofogo are calculated as Line 1); 250k people per day on Line 2; 229 
and, 50k people per day on Line 4. The ridership is predominantly commuters.  230 
Line 1 of the metro system is located underground; Line 2 is above ground and mostly at grade (i.e. level with 231 
the surface, not on embankments or in cuttings) but the infrastructure assets are better contained by walls 232 
and fencing in comparison to the railway network (Section 4.1). Heat (Table 1b) is only considered a problem 233 
on Line 2, and only for the older fleet of trains (c1970s). These have air-conditioning units located beneath 234 
the carriage where temperatures above 70C have been recorded by MetrôRio. When the carriage air-235 
conditioning unit fails the specific carriage can be isolated, and the train remains operational until 236 
maintenance can be undertaken. Heat is not considered a problem for the new fleet operating on Line 2. 237 
These have their air-conditioning units above carriage where the ambient temperatures are relatively cooler.  238 
Heat is not considered a problem for Line 1, which is underground and therefore cooler.  239 
Heavy rainfall directly impacts operations on Line 2 (Table 1b); during heavy rainfall the trains may run at a 240 
slower speed, and flooding from the city can inundate the metro stations and track. For example, on 12th 241 
December 2016, services were suspended at Pavuna station at 6.30pm for approximately 30 minutes (Figure 242 
4a; R7, 2017). Such flooding incidents occur approximately once a year, and are generally short (<2 hours), 243 
although have on occasion lasted all day (e.g. in December 2013 the line was closed between Irajá and Pavuna 244 
for a whole day, UOL, 2013). Normal operations resume once the floodwater has dissipated. Heavy rainfall 245 
and flooding rarely directly impacts operations on Line 1; however, flooding in the neighbourhoods around 246 
the metro station can prevent passengers from entering or leaving the metro station exits (e.g. Catete, Figure 247 
4b).  Entry points to the metro are raised to prevent floodwater ingress. Similar to the railway network, heavy 248 
rainfall changes passenger demand; if there is rainfall in the morning, customers prefer to use cars or buses 249 
rather than make the feeder journey to the underground station in the wet conditions, or avoid making the 250 
journey. If there is heavy rainfall in the afternoon, the metro experiences an increase in demand, and can 251 
accordingly extend their operations to meet this demand, for example until 1 am (e.g. UOL, 2014). MetrôRio 252 
also have problems with high winds bringing debris (from outside their management area) onto the tracks. 253 
Lightning is not considered a problem.  254 
Consideration of climate change is not part of current contractual responsibilities and there is no climate 255 
change strategy. Informally, MetrôRio have discussed resilience to extreme weather with transport operators 256 
from other countries.  257 
 258 
4.3 BRT network: current provision, weather impacts and climate change adaptation 259 
The Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system is a legacy of the 2016 Olympic Games. It is a municipal-level 260 
concession operated by consortia of 17 different operators who own and manage separate assets (e.g. buses, 261 
depots, garages) within the system (Figure 3). There are currently three operational lines: TransOeste 2012 262 
(189k people/day); TransCarioca, 2014 (150k people/day); and TransOlímpica, 2016 (25k people/day). These 263 
 7 
 
serve the West and North Zones of the Rio de Janeiro municipality. The TransBrasil line will operate in the 264 
North and Central Zone when complete (estimated 2018).  265 
BRT systems are characterised by: dedicated bus corridors; off-board fare collection systems; platform level 266 
boarding; a headway (i.e. equal spacing between buses)  system rather than timetabling; and fewer stations 267 
(for a review see Deng & Nelson, 2010). An integrated bus feeder system connects different neighbourhoods 268 
with the trunk BRT lines with passengers travelling on one fare throughout their journey. These features 269 
shorten travel time; the TransOeste line reduced the nominal travel time for commuters from the West Zone 270 
from 3 hours to 50 minutes. The corridor and platform infrastructure is owned by the municipality who are 271 
responsible for past and future construction works. The BRT fleet is fully air-conditioned and composed of 272 
450 articulated and bi-articulated buses procured 3-5 years ago, with an expected lifetime of 10 years.  273 
Heat, particularly temperatures above 37°C cause the greatest volume of problems for BRT on all lines and 274 
the new fleet requires frequent (and higher than originally anticipated) maintenance to repair failed air-275 
conditioning units and engines that have overheated (Table 1c). The windows on BRT buses do not open and 276 
air-conditioning is essential for passenger comfort and well-being. On hot days, there have been up to 90 277 
buses out of operation (from the fleet of 450, all of which are required during peak demand), predominately 278 
due to heat-related failures, reducing the service provision. To mitigate, on hot days BRT have garages, 279 
replacement parts and mechanics on standby to return the bus to operation as quickly as possible. Buses 280 
removed from operations in the morning are often returned to service by the afternoon. However, the BRT 281 
consortia believe that heat-related failures are a short and medium term problem with no solution. The buses 282 
used the best technology that was available at time of procurement, and BRT consortia can only cost-283 
effectively renew the fleet on the planned decadal timescale.  284 
On the asphalt corridors of the TransOeste route, poor drainage combined with the pavement deformation 285 
from high temperatures and the heavy weight of the BRT buses has caused rapid deterioration of road surface 286 
including potholes. These damage the vehicle undercarriage and reduce the durability of the braking 287 
components, suspension and electric systems (Lindau et al. 2016), and buses have to operate at a slower 288 
speed. The later TransOlímpica and TransCarioca lines use concrete corridors and do not have these 289 
problems.  290 
The BRT bus corridors also pass through parts of the city vulnerable to flooding (e.g. Olaria, Penha; Figure 291 
3b). The BRT corridors and the stations can flood; and flooding of nearby streets can prevent passengers 292 
reaching the BRT stations. Flooding events occur approximately 4-6 times per year between November and 293 
March and are generally resolved in a maximum of 5-6 hours. BRT consortia have a flood-risk map, and 294 
contingency plans whereby the buses can transfer to public roads if the corridor is flooded. Should BRT 295 
operations cease due to road flooding there are few alternative modes for passengers; most of the BRT 296 
corridors operate in areas where there are no metro or rail links.     297 
The BRT system was a transport legacy of the 2016 Olympic Games and thus conceived, designed, and 298 
constructed in a period where climate change was widely accepted. However, there are currently no climate 299 
change adaptation or mitigation strategies.  300 
4.4 COR (Centre of Operations for the City of Rio de Janeiro) 301 
The Centre of Operations for the City of Rio de Janeiro (COR: Centro de Operações Prefeitura do Rio5) was 302 
inaugurated in 2010. It brings together data and personnel from over 30 different state and municipal 303 
departments (e.g. civil defence, fire service) and concessions (e.g. SuperVia, MetrôRio, BRT), originally to co-304 
ordinate and integrate response to emergency situations, and optimise daily operations within the city (Fig 305 
5).  From December 2010 to January 2017, COR responded to extreme weather such as heavy rainfall using 306 
a three-level alert system for the city (green/amber/red). The in-house expertise of geologists and 307 
                                                          
5 http://cor.rio/ 
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meteorologists provided real-time information on hazards, which was combined with real-time monitoring 308 
and information on the ground. COR integrated the emergency response (e.g. pumping floodwater, 309 
redirecting traffic) across departments, including advising transport operators to issue a Siga Viagem ticket 310 
that can be used cross modes. COR disseminated information (e.g. travel updates) to the public via the 311 
pressroom and social media.  312 
Moreover, COR also improves daily operations by integrating separate departments; for example, waste 313 
collection services can liaise drainage infrastructure operators and meteorologists to clean or check drains 314 
and pipes in regions prone to flooding. SuperVia, MetrôRio, BRT and other transport operators also receive 315 
real-time information from the COR6 (e.g. weather forecasts) to improve their daily operations and SuperVia, 316 
MetrôRio, and BRT voluntarily (it is not a contractual obligation) have officers located within the COR for 317 
information exchange. During the 2016 Olympics SuperVia, MetrôRio, BRT consortia, and other operators 318 
(e.g. Rio Onibus) participated in the Centro Integrado de Mobilidade Urbana (CIMU) to produce detailed 319 
contingency plans for public transport during the Olympics, and monitor the public transportation networks 320 
in real-time. This improved transport integration at an operational level and several transport operators 321 
explicitly mentioned that this was a useful and positive experience. However, this high-level integration by 322 
the transport operators that included real-time monitoring and detailed contingency planning ceased after 323 
the Olympics. One operator explicitly noted that continuing this detailed planning would improve their 324 
service provision. For example, when a problem that leads to a line closure, the operator directs passengers 325 
to a bus service without knowing if there are sufficient (or indeed any) buses to deal with the increased 326 
number of passengers.  327 
On behalf of the previous (2008-2016) City Government COR recently commissioned the Climate Change 328 
Adaptation Strategy for the City of Rio de Janeiro (CCAS, 2016) and produced a city resilience strategy (Rio 329 
Resiliente, 2016). Neither strategy explicitly addresses transport resilience to weather and climatic change, 330 
but it is considered in both (Table 2).  331 
 332 
5 Discussion 333 
 334 
5.1 Are the main transport systems resilient to current weather and future climatic change?  335 
The Brown Review (DfT, 2014) considered UK transport resilience from a multi-modal operational perspective 336 
defining transport resilience as the “ability of the transport network to withstand the impacts of extreme 337 
weather, to operate in the face of such weather and to recover promptly from its effects” (DfT, 2014).  It gives 338 
three layers of resilience; (i) ensuring people and goods continue moving during extreme weather; (ii) where 339 
this is not possible, restoring services and routes to normal as quickly as possible; and (iii) providing clear and 340 
effective communication to transport users to reduce the impact of disruption. In these terms, the railway, 341 
metro and BRT can be considered broadly resilient. For example, to keep passengers moving in extreme heat 342 
the metro train may continue operating by isolating a carriage where the air-conditioning has failed; during 343 
heavy rain, the railway and metro can operate with a longer headway between vehicles; in flood conditions 344 
the BRT can use alternative routing. All transport operators are linked via a commercially available instant 345 
messaging service (Whatsapp) group managed by COR to share key information such as weather alerts and 346 
level of service. To restore transport services following urban flooding, there are established procedures7 347 
coordinated by COR to alleviate the impact of flooding (e.g. deploying Civil Defence officers to scene, 348 
rerouting traffic, communication between transport operators, Siga Viagem ticket). On hot days, BRT 349 
mechanics are on standby for heat-related failure. Finally, COR and all transport operators have public 350 
communication methods - from platform tannoys to internet and social media for those passengers who 351 
                                                          
6 Correct as of January 2017 
7 Correct of January 2017 
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have (and feel safe to) use a smart phone. COR also have a separate system for communicating with favela 352 
residents during extreme rainfall events.  353 
Holling (1996) defines ecological resilience as the amount of disturbance a system can take before it changes 354 
to a new steady state. This is useful for considering climatic change for the transport systems may need to 355 
adapt to different ‘normal’ conditions in the future when extreme weather such as high temperatures or 356 
heavy rainfall are projected to occur more frequently (Dereczynski et al., 2013; Silva et al., 2014).  In this 357 
context, the transport systems are not resilient for climate change as adaptation is not part of current 358 
operational procedures or future planning for the railway, metro or BRT networks.  359 
On a final note, Wang (2016) suggests resilience as “the quality that leads to recovery, reliability and 360 
sustainability”. Financial sustainability is paramount for all public transport systems, particularly with 361 
multiple private operators involved. The unexpected heat-related problems have led to higher than 362 
anticipated maintenance costs on all BRT lines. If extreme weather occurs more frequently in the future and 363 
the transport systems remain unchanged, it follows that the amount of disruption and associated cost will 364 
increase (e.g. Dobney et al., 2009).  Adapting transport infrastructure to extreme weather therefore has the 365 
potential to reduce future operational costs, and should therefore be part of long-term strategic planning, 366 
particularly as SuperVia and MetrôRio have operational contracts until 2048 and 2038 respectively. 367 
Frameworks for adapting infrastructure for climatic change exist in various sectors. For example,  PIANC 368 
(World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure) is preparing good practice guidance on climate 369 
change adaptation for ports and inland waterways (PIANC, 2017); PIARC (World Road Association) considers 370 
climate change adaptation from road transport (PIARC, 2016); and, the International Union of Railway’s (IUC) 371 
Rail Adapt project has developed framework that can be integrated into daily operations and longer-term 372 
planning so that climate change adaption can become part of business as usual (Quinn et al., submitted).  373 
 374 
5.2 How could transport resilience be improved in Rio de Janeiro? 375 
This study makes five recommendations to improve transport resilience which are relevant to all 376 
stakeholders. These are based on the local transport context (Sections 4.1 – 4.4), previous research (e.g. 377 
MOWE-IT, DfT, 2014), best practice (e.g. Network Rail, 2015; RSSB, 2015), and the views of the transport 378 
operators and academics who participated in this study. 379 
1. Quantify the impact of weather on the transport system. This would provide an evidence base to 380 
analyse current operational performance and prioritise future investment (e.g. Network Rail, 2015). 381 
Meteorological data from COR could be combined with performance data from the operator (e.g. fault 382 
data, number of passengers) to determine the impact of specific weather events (e.g. Jaroszweski et al., 383 
2014; Ferranti et al., 2016, 2017) or to quantify resilience (e.g. D’Lima & Medda, 2015). It would support 384 
sustainable mobility initiatives 2.1, 2.4, 2.6, 2.7, 5.2 and operating under extreme weather initiatives 1.1, 385 
1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 from the Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (2016; Table 2).  386 
 387 
2. Undertake a Climate Change Risk Assessment for transport. The evidence base from recommendation 388 
1 could be linked with climate change projections for the region (e.g. Silva et al., 2014) and used to create 389 
a risk assessment, in order to develop an adaptation strategy for transport (e.g. Dawson et al., 2016). 390 
This would support sustainable mobility initiatives 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 and operating under 391 
extreme weather initiatives 1.1, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3; Table 2. Higher resolution climate change 392 
projections (e.g. UKCIP Climate Impacts Programme8) which incorporated the urban heat island effect 393 
would aid the decision-making process.   394 
 395 
                                                          
8 http://www.ukcip.org.uk/ 
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3. Continue operational integration of transport systems. The detailed contingency planning and improved 396 
operational integration led by CIMU at COR for the Olympics undoubtedly improved transport resilience 397 
by ensuring an integrated response to transport problems. Evidence from recommendations 1 and 2 398 
could be used to identify meteorological conditions that cause significant disruption, and therefore 399 
prioritise integrated contingency planning (supporting sustainable mobility initiatives 2.1, 2.3, 2.8 and 400 
operating under extreme weather initiatives 1.2, 1.5; Table 2).  401 
 402 
4. Improve integration of transport systems at strategic planning level. SuperVia, MetrôRio, and the BRT 403 
consortia are infrastructure operators appointed competitively. Additionally there are over 70 private 404 
bus companies operating in the municipal area. The independence of the different private operators may 405 
have led to missed opportunities to improve integration and transport resilience. For example, the 406 
TransBrasil BRT corridor intersects with the railway line close to Barros Filho station. Integrated planning 407 
could have provided a new transport hub, therefore increasing transport resilience by facilitating a modal 408 
exchange between systems. Long-term strategic planning should include making transport resilience to 409 
weather and climate a contractual responsibility (supporting sustainable mobility initiatives 2.1, 2.3, 2.8, 410 
and operating under extreme weather initiatives 1.2, 1.5, 2.1; Table 2).    411 
 412 
5. Strong leadership from the COR.  Strong leadership is required to integrate the different levels of 413 
governance (e.g. municipal versus state) and the numerous transport operators in order to provide a 414 
holistic and unified approach to transport resilience.  COR is ideally placed for: (i) it integrates city 415 
departments and transport operators together on a daily basis; (ii) it has the necessary physical 416 
infrastructure; (iii) it successfully integrated transport operators during the Olympics in CIMU; and (iii) it 417 
has produced early warning and emergency response protocols for landslides. The tacit knowledge 418 
developed in COR from responding to previous emergencies including extreme weather must not be 419 
underestimated. 420 
 421 
 422 
6. Concluding discussion 423 
Making the transportation systems of RMJA resilient to weather and climate change is more complex than 424 
providing engineering solutions to disruption called by extreme weather. There needs to be a change in 425 
culture so that the impacts of climate change such as pluvial flooding, extreme heat, and sea-level rise are 426 
routinely considered in long-term infrastructure investments and climate adaption becomes part of business 427 
as usual (Quinn et al., submitted). However, in RJMA, like other rapidly urbanising areas, “infrastructure is 428 
not suitable for the present” (transport operator) and responding to every day operational problems often 429 
takes priority over long-term strategic planning that would prevent the problems occurring in the first place 430 
(Cevero, 2013). Infrastructure typically has an operational lifetime of several decades or more, and poor 431 
design decisions have long-term consequences. Failure to incorporate future extreme weather will lead to 432 
expensive retrofitting and/or unreliability. For example, the short-term decision to reduce costs by using 433 
asphalt on the TransCarioca BRT corridor has led to long-term higher maintenance costs, and potentially 434 
increased fares for passengers. Indeed, Kassens-Noor et al. (2016) argues that the BRT system was conceived 435 
to win the short-term Olympic bidding process and facilitate tourist and athlete transport, rather than meet 436 
longer-term urban transport demand.  437 
Infrastructure should not be considered as a series of disconnected assets, but instead a system-of-systems 438 
with cross-sectoral issues, challenges and interdependencies (Hall et al., 2013). This is particularly true for 439 
the RJMA as municipal resilience to weather (e.g. urban flooding) is inextricable from transport resilience. 440 
Integration between the many transport operators and city and state departments is therefore essential for 441 
daily transport operations and strategic transportation planning. The evolution of COR since 2010 has led to 442 
huge improvements in the response to extreme weather and the beginnings of a climate change adaptation 443 
 11 
 
strategy for transport (CCAS, 2016). Since the change of mayor the chief resilience officer at COR has changed 444 
twice, COR is currently led by a commissioner from the municipal guard, and the focus of COR is switching to 445 
security (Globo 2017b). Protocols for warning the public and managing city-level response to flooding appear 446 
to have changed since interviews were undertaken in January 2017 (Globo 2017c). Maintaining CORs strong 447 
leadership on climate change and transport integration is a key recommendation to improve transport 448 
resilience.  449 
This study provides a unique perspective on transport resilience to weather and climate developed from 450 
interviews with transport operators, city officials and academics in Rio de Janeiro. Few transport resilience 451 
studies focus on the global south despite the importance of transport systems to urban residents and the 452 
growing number of megacities in the global south. The recommendations to improve transport resilience in 453 
this study will be relevant to other urban areas. More perspectives are needed from the global south to 454 
complement and enrich existing transport resilience research mainly from the developed global north.  455 
 456 
Acknowledgments 457 
This work was undertaken under Impact Acceleration Accounts funding awarded to the University of 458 
Birmingham by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). 459 
 460 
  461 
 12 
 
References 462 
Brasil, 2017. Ministério das Cidades. Secretaria Nacional de Saneamento Ambiental – SNSA. Sistema Nacional de 463 
Informações sobre Saneamento: Diagnóstico dos Serviços de Água e Esgotos – 2015. Brasília: SNSA/MCIDADES. 212 p. 464 
: il. 465 
Cervero, R.B., 2013. Linking urban transport and land use in developing countries. Journal of Transport and Land 466 
Use, 6(1), pp.7-24. 467 
Castro, D. G., Gaffney, C., Novaes, P. R., Rodrigues, J. M., Santos, C. P. dos, & Santos Junior, O. A. dos (Eds.). (2015). Rio 468 
de Janeiro: os impactos da Copa do Mundo 2014 e das Olimpíadas 2016 (1st ed.). Rio de Janeiro: Letra Capital. 469 
CCAS, 2016. Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for the City of Rio de Janeiro. Rio Prefeirura: Rio de Janeiro. Available 470 
at: http://centroclima.coppe.ufrj.br/images/Noticias/documentos/estrategia-ing.pdf 471 
Coumou, D. and Rahmstorf, S., 2012. A decade of weather extremes. Nature climate change, 2(7), pp.491-496. 472 
Dawson, R.J., Thompson, D., Johns, D., Gosling, S., Chapman, L., Darch, G., Watson, G., Powrie, W., Bell, S., Paulson, K., 473 
Hughes, P., and Wood, R. (2016) UK Climate Change Risk Assessment Evidence Report: Chapter 4, Infrastructure. 474 
Report prepared for the Adaptation Sub-Committee of the Committee on Climate Change, London. 475 
De Sherbinin, A., Schiller, A. and Pulsipher, A., 2007. The vulnerability of global cities to climate hazards. Environment 476 
and Urbanization, 19(1), pp.39-64. 477 
De Lucena, A.J., de Faria Peres, L., Rotunno Filho, O.C. and de Almeida França, J.R., 2015, March. Estimation of the 478 
urban heat island in the Metropolitan Area of Rio de Janeiro-Brazil. In Urban Remote Sensing Event (JURSE), 2015 Joint 479 
(pp. 1-4). IEEE. 480 
DfT. 2014. Transport resilience review: a review of the resilience of the transport network to extreme weather events. 481 
HMSO: London, 166 pp. 482 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/335265/transport-resilience-483 
review-print.pdf 484 
D’Lima, M. and Medda, F., 2015. A new measure of resilience: An application to the London Underground. 485 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 81, pp.35-46. 486 
Dereczynski, C., Silva, W.L. and Marengo, J., 2013. Detection and projections of climate change in Rio de Janeiro, 487 
Brazil. American Journal of Climate Change, 2(1), pp.25-33. 488 
DfT. 2014. Transport resilience review: a review of the resilience of the transport network to extreme weather events. 489 
HMSO: London, 166 pp. 490 
Dobney, K., Baker, C.J., Chapman, L. and Quinn, A.D., 2010. The future cost to the United Kingdom's railway network 491 
of heat-related delays and buckles caused by the predicted increase in high summer temperatures owing to climate 492 
change. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit, 224(1), pp.25-493 
34. 494 
Ferranti, E.J.S.,  Chapman, L., Lee, S., Jaroszweski, D.J., Lowe, C., McCulloch, S., Quinn, A.J. <in press> The hottest July 495 
day on the railway network; insights and thoughts for the future. Meteorological Applications.  496 
Fischer, E.M. and Knutti, R., 2015. Anthropogenic contribution to global occurrence of heavy-precipitation and high-497 
temperature extremes. Nature Climate Change, 5(6), pp.560-564. 498 
Gakenheimer, R., 1999. Urban mobility in the developing world. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 499 
33(7), pp.671-689. 500 
Globo 2016 Chuva deixa passageiros ilhados no Catete, no Rio [Rain leaves passengers on an island in Catete]. 20th 501 
Septmeber 2016.  http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2016/09/chuva-deixa-pontos-de-alagamento-e-causa-502 
transtornos-no-rio.html Accessed 31/08/2017. 503 
 13 
 
Globo 2017a Ramal de Japeri para e passageiros não conseguem voltar da festa de réveillon [Japeri branch closed and 504 
passengers cannot return from the New Year's Eve party]. 2nd January 2017. http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-505 
janeiro/noticia/ramal-de-japeri-para-e-passageiros-nao-conseguem-voltar-da-festa-de-reveillon.ghtml Accessed 506 
17/08/2017.  507 
Globo 2017b Após temporal, Centro de Operações troca comando e reforça foco em segurança [After some time, 508 
Operations Center switches command and reinforces focus on security. 21st June 2017. 509 
https://oglobo.globo.com/rio/apos-temporal-centro-de-operacoes-troca-comando-reforca-foco-em-seguranca-510 
21522428#ixzz4rKydp4US Accessed 31/08/2017. 511 
Globo 2017c Prefeitura não divulgou aviso sobre gravidade de chuva na terça para evitar pânico, diz secretário de 512 
Ordem Pública [City Hall has not issued notice of rain on Tuesday to avoid panic, says Secretary of Public Order]. 21st 513 
June 2017. http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/prefeitura-nao-divulgou-aviso-sobre-gravidade-de-chuva-para-514 
evitar-panico-diz-secretario-de-ordem-515 
publica.ghtml?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=rjtv Accessed 31/08/2017. 516 
GRJ 2016. Rio Mobilidade. Programas políticas de mobilidade urbana da Região Metropolitana do Estado do Rio de 517 
Janeiro. Relatório Síntese – Apoio ao programa de intergração e mobilidade urbana da Região Metropolitana do Rio 518 
de Janeiro. Secretaria de Transportes, Governo do Rio de Janeiro. AFD N° CBR 1042 01 J 519 
Hall, J. W., Henriques, J. J., Hickford, A. J., & Nicholls, R. J. (2013). Systems-of-systems analysis of national 520 
infrastructure. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers-Engineering Sustainability, 166(5), 249-257. 521 
Holling, C.S., 1996. Engineering resilience versus ecological resilience. Engineering within ecological constraints, 522 
31(1996), p.32. 523 
Hearn, G., 2015. Managing road transport in a world of changing climate and land use. In Proceedings of the 524 
Institution of Civil Engineers-Municipal Engineer (Vol. 169, No. 3, pp. 146-159). Thomas Telford Ltd. 525 
ITF 2016 Adapting Transport to Climate Change and Extreme Weather: Implications for Infrastructure Owners and 526 
Network Managers, ITF Research Reports, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789282108079-en 527 
Jaroszweski, D., Chapman, L. and Petts, J., 2010. Assessing the potential impact of climate change on transportation: 528 
the need for an interdisciplinary approach. Journal of Transport Geography, 18(2), pp.331-335. 529 
Jaroszweski, D., Hooper, E. and Chapman, L., 2014. The impact of climate change on urban transport resilience in a 530 
changing world. Progress in Physical Geography, 38(4), pp.448-463. 531 
Jaroszweski, D., Hooper, E., Baker, C., Chapman, L. and Quinn, A., 2015. The impacts of the 28 June 2012 storms on UK 532 
road and rail transport. Meteorological Applications, 22(3), pp.470-476. 533 
Kassens-Noor, E., Gaffney, C., Messina, J. and Phillips, E., 2016. Olympic Transport Legacies: Rio de Janeiro’s Bus Rapid 534 
Transit System. Journal of Planning Education and Research, pp. 1-12. 535 
Koetse, M.J. and Rietveld, P., 2009. The impact of climate change and weather on transport: An overview of empirical 536 
findings. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 14(3), pp.205-221. 537 
Koetse, M.J. and Rietveld, P., 2012. Adaptation to climate change in the transport sector. Transport Reviews, 32(3), 538 
pp.267-286. 539 
Leviäkangas, P. and Michaelides, S., 2014. Transport system management under extreme weather risks: views to 540 
project appraisal, asset value protection and risk-aware system management. Natural hazards, 72(1), pp.263-286. 541 
Mattsson, L.G. and Jenelius, E., 2015. Vulnerability and resilience of transport systems–a discussion of recent research. 542 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 81, pp.16-34. 543 
Met Office 2017. Rio de Janeiro weather http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/holiday-weather/americas/brazil/rio-de-544 
janeiro Accessed 16/08/2017 545 
Mirza, M.M.Q., 2003. Climate change and extreme weather events: can developing countries adapt?. Climate 546 
policy, 3(3), pp.233-248. 547 
 14 
 
Molarius, R., Könönen, V., Leviäkangas, P., Rönty, J., Hietajärvi, A.M. and Oiva, K., 2014. The extreme weather risk 548 
indicators (EWRI) for the European transport system. Natural hazards, 72(1), pp.189-210. 549 
Morichi, S., 2005. Long-term strategy for transport system in Asian megacities. Journal of the Eastern Asia society for 550 
transportation studies, 6, pp.1-22. 551 
Motte, B., Aguilera, A., Bonin, O. and Nassi, C.D., 2016. Commuting patterns in the metropolitan region of Rio de 552 
Janeiro. What differences between formal and informal jobs?. Journal of Transport Geography, 51, pp.59-69. 553 
National Research Council, 2008. Potential impacts of climate change on U.S. transportation. Transportation Research 554 
Board Special Report 290, Washington. 555 
Network Rail, 2015. Weather Resilience and Climate Change plans by route. September 2014. 556 
https://www.networkrail.co.uk/communities/environment/climate-change-weather-resilience/weather-resilience/ 557 
Accessed 30/08/2017. 558 
Palin, E.J., Thornton, H.E., Mathison, C.T., McCarthy, R.E., Clark, R.T. and Dora, J., 2013. Future projections of 559 
temperature-related climate change impacts on the railway network of Great Britain. Climatic Change, 120(1-2), 560 
pp.71-93. 561 
Paschoal, B. and Wegrich, K., 2017. Urban governance innovations in Rio de Janeiro: The political management of 562 
digital innovations. Journal of Urban Affairs, pp.1-18. 563 
PDTU 2015. Plano diretor de transporte urbano da região metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro. [Urban transport master 564 
plan for the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro]. Rio de Janeiro: Governo do Estado. Secretaria de Estado de 565 
Transportes. http://www.rj.gov.br/web/setrans/exibeconteudo?article-id=626280. Accessed 12/12/2017. 566 
PIARC, 2016. Transport Strategies for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation. Online]. [Accessed 31/12/2017]. 567 
Available from: https://www.piarc.org/ressources/publications/9/25781,2016R25EN.pdf 568 
PIANC, 2017. Guidance on Climate Change Adaptation for Ports and Inland Waterways. [Online]. [Accessed 569 
31/12/2017]. Available from: http://www.pianc.org/climatechangeadaptation.php 570 
Pereira, R. H., Banister, D., Schwanen, T., and Wessel, N.  2017. Distributional effects of transport policies on 571 
inequalities in access to opportunities in Rio de Janeiro (preprint).  osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/cghx2. Accessed 572 
01/02/2018. 573 
Quinn, A.D., Ferranti, E.J.S., Hodgkinson, S., Jack, A., Beckford , J., and Dora, J. [submitted] Adaptation as Business As 574 
Usual: A framework for climate-change-ready transport infrastructure. Infrastructures. 575 
R7 2016 Rio: chuva forte causa alagamentos e paralisa trens e metro [Rio: heavy rain causes floods and paralyzes 576 
trains and subway]. 12th December 2016. http://noticias.r7.com/rio-de-janeiro/rio-chuva-forte-causa-alagamentos-e-577 
paralisa-trens-e-metro-12122016. Accessed 17/08/2017 578 
Rahmstorf, S. and Coumou, D., 2011. Increase of extreme events in a warming world. Proceedings of the National 579 
Academy of Sciences, 108(44), pp.17905-17909. 580 
Reggiani, A., Nijkamp, P. and Lanzi, D., 2015. Transport resilience and vulnerability: the role of connectivity. 581 
Transportation research part A: policy and practice, 81, pp.4-15. 582 
Rio Resiliente 2016. Resilience Strategy of the City of Rio de Janeiro. http://www.100resilientcities.org/wp-583 
content/uploads/2017/07/estra_res_rio_ingles_2.pdf Accessed 27/08/2017.  584 
Rio Times 2017a Prosecutors Say Rio’s Metro Line 4 had Billions in Fraudulent Billing, 4th May, 2017.  585 
http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/rios-metro-line-4-had-billions-in-fraudulent-billing-say-586 
prosecutors/ Accessed 26/07/2017 587 
Rio Times 2017b Federal Police Investigate Rio’s Public Transport Companies, 5th July 2017. 588 
http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/federal-police-investigate-rios-public-transport-companies/. 589 
Accessed 26/07/2017 590 
 15 
 
RJ24 2016 Rio: Chuva alaga metrô e deixa cidade em estágio de atenção [Rio: Rain floods subway and leaves city in 591 
stage of alert]. 13th December 2016. http://www.jornalodebate24horas.com/2016/12/rio-chuva-alaga-metro-e-deixa-592 
cidade-em.html Accessed 30/08/2017. 593 
RSSB, 2015, Tomorrow's Railway and Climate Change Adaptation: Work Package 1 Summary Report. The Arup TRaCCA 594 
WP1 Consortium (Arup, CIRIA, JBA Consulting, the Met Office and the University of Birmingham) in collaboration with 595 
the RSSB Project Team (RSSB, John Dora Consulting Ltd and Network Rail), the TRaCCA Steering Group and expert 596 
stakeholders from the GB rail industry. http://www.rssb.co.uk/improving-industry-performance/climate-change-597 
adaptation 598 
Schweikert, A., Chinowsky, P., Espinet, X. and Tarbert, M., 2014. Climate change and infrastructure impacts: 599 
comparing the impact on roads in ten countries through 2100. Procedia Engineering, 78, pp.306-316. 600 
Silva, W.L., Dereczynski, C., Chou, S.C. and Cavalcanti, I., 2014. Future changes in temperature and precipitation 601 
extremes in the state of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). American Journal of Climate Change, 3(04), p.353. 602 
UOL 2014 Metrô do Rio vai funcionar até a 1h devido às chuvas [Rio subway will run until 1am due to rainfall]. 16th 603 
January 2014. https://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-noticias/2014/01/16/metro-do-rio-vai-funcionar-ate-a-604 
1h-devido-as-chuvas.htm?mobile. Accessed 31/08/2017. 605 
UOL, 2018. Com sensação térmica de 43,1ºC no Rio, trilhos de trem dilatam e interrompem viagens [With a thermal 606 
sensation of 43.1ºC in Rio, train rails buckle  and interrupts trips]. 19th January 2018. 607 
https://noticias.bol.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/brasil/2018/01/19/com-sensacao-termica-de-431c-trilhos-de-trem-608 
dilatam-no-rio-e-interrompem-viagens.htm?cmpid=copiaecola. Accessed 31/01/2018. 609 
UN 2016a United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2016). The World’s Cities in 610 
2016 – Data Booklet (ST/ESA/ SER.A/392). 611 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/urbanization/the_worlds_cities_in_2016_dat612 
a_booklet.pdf 613 
UN 2016b United Nations, First Global Sustainable Transport Outlook Report  “Mobilizing Sustainable Transport for 614 
Development” . Analysis and Policy Recommendations from the United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level 615 
Advisory Group on Sustainable Transport. 616 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2375Mobilizing%20Sustainable%20Transport.pdf 617 
UOL, 2013. Chuva forte no Rio fecha linhas de trem e Metrô; homem está desaparecido [Heavy rain in Rio closes the 618 
train and metro lines: a man is missing]. 11th December, 2013. https://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-619 
noticias/2013/12/11/chuva-forte-deixa-rio-em-alerta-e-fecha-aeroporto-homem-esta-desaparecido.htm Accessed 620 
18/08/2017.  621 
Wang, J.Y., 2015. ‘Resilience thinking’ in transport planning. Civil Engineering and Environmental Systems, 32(1-2), 622 
pp.180-191. 623 
  624 
 16 
 
Figures and Tables 625 
 626 
 627 
Figure 1: a) Brazil; b) Rio de Janeiro State; and c) Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area. Zones in Rio de Janeiro 628 
municipality are marked as: W=West Zone, N=North Zone, C=Central Zone, and S=South Zone.  629 
  630 
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 632 
Figure 2: a) Population density (2010); and, b) employment density (2012). Figures modified from PDTU (2015). 633 
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 635 
Figure 3 Public transport map for: a) Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Area; and b) the central, north and southern zones 636 
of the municipality Rio de Janeiro. 637 
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Figure 4: Impact of heavy rainfall and urban flooding on the metro system: a) Pavuna station on 13th 649 
December 2 016 (RJ24, 2016); b) Entrance to Catete station on 20th September 2016 (Globo, 2016) 650 
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 663 
Figure 5: Inside the Centre of Operations for the City of Rio de Janeiro (COR: Centro de Operações 664 
Prefeitura do Rio 665 
 666 
  667 
a) b) 
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Table 1a: The impact of weather on the railway network in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region 669 
Weather hazard Occurrence   Potential impact Mitigation measures (where known) 
Heat Frequently during 
summer (Dec-Feb) 
Direct Rail buckle 
Line sag 
Track circuit 
Visual inspection if temperature 
exceeds 35C. Reduced operational 
speed when line-sag is an issue.   
Rainfall At least once per 
winter season 
Direct Flooding of station 
Flooding of line 
 
Lineside operatives remove rubbish 
that could exacerbate flooding.  
SuperVia own pumps to remove 
water; these are overwhelmed 
during heavy rainfall events. 
Indirect Neighbourhood flooding preventing access to 
station 
Change in passenger behaviour 
 
Wind At least once per 
winter season 
Direct Debris on line 
Damage to overhead cables 
 
Lightning unknown Direct Damage to telecommunications and signalling  
 670 
Table 1b: The impact of weather on the metro system in the Rio de Janeiro 671 
Weather hazard Occurrence   Potential impact Mitigation measures (where known) 
Heat unknown Direct Aircon failure on older fleet on Line 2 which is 
overground 
Individual carriage can be closed and 
isolated to allow the train operations 
to continue until maintenance is 
possible 
Rainfall  Direct Flooding of station or access to station (Line 2) 
Flooding of line (Line 2) 
 
MetrôRio have pumps at vulnerable 
stations 
 Indirect Neighbourhood flooding preventing access to 
station 
Change in passenger behaviour 
 
 
Extend the opening hours to 
accommodate passengers who are 
travelling later to avoid wet weather 
Wind  Direct Debris on line  
 672 
Table 1c: The impact of weather on the BRT network in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region 673 
Weather hazard Occurrence   Potential impact Mitigation measures (where known) 
Heat Commonplace 
during summer 
(Dec-Feb) 
Direct Failure of air-con 
Engine overheating 
Damage to asphalt corridors 
Garages on standby to mend heat-
related failures 
 
Concrete corridors used for newer 
BRT routes 
Garages on standby to mend heat-
related failures 
Indirect Increased maintenance caused by damage to 
bus undercarriage caused by uneven asphalt 
road surface caused by melting and rutting.  
Buses travel at slower speed 
Rainfall and 
flooding 
Frequent  Direct Flooding and poor drainage (combined with 
heat) has damaged the road surface 
 
Concrete corridors used for newer 
BRT routes 
Buses travel at slower speed 
Flooding of station or bus corridors (~ 4-6 times 
per year between November and March) 
Flood-risk map, and contingency 
plans for buses to transfer to public 
roads 
High-resolution rain & flood forecasts 
from COR meteorologists  
Indirect Increased maintenance caused by damage to 
bus undercarriage caused by uneven asphalt 
road surface  
 
Neighbourhood flooding preventing access to 
stations 
 
 674 
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Table 2: Climate change initiatives relevant to transport summarised from the Climate Change and 676 
Adaption Strategy for the City of Rio de Janeiro (CCAS, 2016).   677 
Strategic Axis Line of Action Initiative Climate Hazard Actor 
Ensure efficient 
and sustainable 
mobility 
1. Promote more 
balanced territorial 
development 
integrated with 
transport systems 
1.2 Improve the road/path connections around 
medium-high capacity stations which are prone 
to flooding 
flooding SMTR 
2. Increase the 
safety of road and 
rail infrastructure 
2.1 Understand the individual and systemic 
risks of the operation of transport modes and 
how they can be intensified by climate change 
flooding, 
heat waves, 
landslides 
City Government, academics, 
transport operators, 
AGETRANSP 
2.2 Incorporate the risks of future climate 
projections in planning for medium and high-
capacity transport systems 
flooding, 
high temperatures, 
sea level rise 
State Government 
2.3 Promote physical integrations between 
transport modes 
flooding, 
heat waves, 
landslides 
SMTR, SMO, transport 
operators, State Government 
2.4 Adjust the procedures for monitoring and 
maintenance of transport infrastructure 
flooding, 
sea level rise, 
heat waves, 
landslides 
Secretariat for Public Works, 
transport operators, State 
Government, SMO, academics, 
COMLURB 
2.5 Adapt the asphalt pavement of the BRT 
corridors and structural road ways to high 
temperatures 
high temperatures, 
extreme 
temperatures 
transport operators, 
academics, SMO 
2.6 Foster a fleet of buses with greater 
resilience to wear and tear associated with 
heat 
extreme 
temperatures 
transport operators, 
academics, SMTR 
2.7 Promote thermal comfort of bus stops, 
terminals, trains and subway 
extreme 
temperatures 
transport operators, 
AGETRANSP, SMO, SMTR 
2.8 Develop and Integrated Contingency Plan 
for the transport system as a whole 
flooding, sea level 
rise, landslides, 
heatwaves 
COR, Cet-Rio, Civil Defence, 
transport operators 
5. Strengthen the 
institutional 
capacity of the 
transport sector 
5.2 Create integrated monitoring system for 
damages caused by climatic events in transport 
flooding, sea level 
rise, landslides, 
heatwaves 
transport operators, State 
Government, SMTR, COR 
Ensure the 
operation of 
strategic 
infrastructure 
under adverse 
weather 
conditions 
 
 
1. Guide the 
operation of 
Strategic 
Infrastructures (R – 
Response, O-
Operation, E-
Education) 
1.1 Develop studies to improve the 
understanding of the potential impacts of 
climate change on strategic infrastructure 
(R,O,E) 
all City Government, academics 
1.2 Monitor the interdependencies of different 
sectors (R, O, E) 
all 
City Government, utilities, 
other partner and public 
entities 
1.3 Expand the coverage of urban sectors by 
reinforcing redundancy and diversification of 
networks (O) 
all 
City Government, utilities, 
other partner and public 
entities, Federal and State 
government, academics 
1.4 Adjust maintenance frequency in light of 
climatic events (R, O, E) 
all 
City Government, utilities, 
other partner and public 
entities 
1.5 Plan the increase in future demand and the 
implementation of back-up or diversified 
systems (R, O, E) 
all 
City Government, utilities, 
other partner and public 
entities, Federal and State 
government, academics 
2. Promote the 
adequacy of 
Response, 
Operation and 
Education (R, O, E) 
Strategic 
Infrastructures 
2.1 Integrate climate change into concession 
calls, projects, plans, and programs of Strategic 
Infrastructure 
all 
City Government, utilities, 
other partner and public 
entities, academics 
2.2 Adjust the retrofit process considering 
climatic events 
all 
City Government, utilities, 
private sector, Federal and 
State government 
2.3 Re-assess the units that are exposed all 
City, Federal and State 
Governments 
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